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Abstract 
 
A distributed decision support system involving multiple 
clinical  centres  is  crucial  to  the  diagnosis  of  rare 
diseases. Although sharing of valid diagnosed cases can 
facilitate  later  decision  making,  possibly  from 
geographically  different  centres,  the  released 
information  could  reveal  patient  privacy  if  it  is  not 
properly protected. Clinical centres may have to impose 
their distinct regulations and rules that govern the use 
of  their  data  externally.  The  collaboration  of centres, 
therefore,  must  respect  the  collective  policies  and 
ideally,  serve  users  the  most  appropriate  and  useful 
resources possible in the system according to the past 
experience. In this way, the system’s value is entrusted 
and even elevated through continuous collaboration. We 
present  in  this  paper  a  link-anonymised  data  scheme 
and in addition to that, a security model that together 
enforce  privacy  data  security  and  secure  resource 
access for distributed clinical centres. Our illustration 
of the approach involves a prototype medical decision 
support  system,  HealthAgents,  for  brain  tumour 
diagnosis. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Distributed  decision  making  systems  are  becoming 
increasingly  useful  and  important  for  the  efficient 
sharing  of  data  and  services  amongst  collaborative 
partners. Use of these systems, based around distributed 
processing, requires the security design to promote trust. 
The internet infrastructure promotes open transferring of 
data  which  in  itself  is  not  a  safe  environment.  Well-
studied  and  publicly  available  data  encryption 
algorithms can alleviate this problem when incorporated 
into the system messaging network. The data transmitted 
in  these  systems  requires  secure  anonymisation 
processes.  Further,  the  data  access  requires  careful 
management to allow different levels of access rights of 
users distributed amongst multiple organisations. These 
organisations  need  to  use  resources  from  others  and 
prevent their own resources from unauthorised use. If a 
system is over restrictive in resource access control then 
the system is not useful. If a system is not sufficiently 
restrictive  then  the  organisations’  privacy  data  is  in 
danger of being exposed. This paper investigates data 
anonymisation  and  the  access  control  required  for  the 
protection of critical resources in collaborative systems.  
 
2.  HealthAgents  overview  and  link-
anonymised  data  scheme  for  preserving 
privacy  
 
Brain  tumours  are  still  an  important  cause  of 
morbidity and mortality in Europe [1]. The current gold 
standard classification of brain tumours by biopsy and 
histopathological  analysis  involves  invasive  surgical 
procedure and incurs a risk of 2.4-3.5% morbidity and 
0.2-0.8% mortality, in addition to healthcare costs and 
stress  to  patients.  There  is  a  need  to  improve  brain 
tumour  classification,  and  to  provide  non-invasive 
methods  for  brain  tumour  diagnosis  and  prognosis,  to 
aid patient management and treatment.  
The  HealthAgents  project  [2],  funded  by  the  EU’s 
Sixth Framework Programme, aims to build the world’s 
largest distributed data warehouse of brain tumour cases 
data. The multi-disciplinary collaboration involves seven 
educational and research institutions, two SMEs, as well 
as some subcontractor hospitals and external expertise 
groups. These groups are spanned over Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. HealthAgents inherits 
the  achievements  of  its  predecessor  INTERPRET  [3] 
and is related to the ongoing eTUMOUR [4] project. It 
plans  to  create  a  multi-agent  distributed  Decision 
Support  System  (d-DSS)  based  on  novel  medical 
imaging  and  laboratory  tests  to  help  determine  the diagnosis  and  prognosis  of  brain  tumours.  Novel 
medical imaging techniques, such as magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy (MRS), and laboratory techniques, such as 
gene  expression  arrays,  promise  to  deliver  these 
advances. These techniques suffer from a complexity of 
interpretation  which  has  hindered  their  incorporation 
into routine clinical practice. However, they provide an 
excellent  test  bed  for  the  development  of  a  computer 
aided decision support system. Furthermore, the rarity of 
many brain tumour types requires that information must 
be sought from many hospitals.  The use of a distributed 
system  for  data  collection  and  management  is,  as  a 
result, a necessity. 
Prior  to  incorporation  into  clinical  practice  new 
methods  must  be  fully  tested  within  a  clinical  trials 
setting. Such trials are subject not only to data protection 
laws  but  also  regulations  governing  clinical  trials 
including ethical approval and informed consent of the 
participants. For multinational projects, ethical approval 
is devolved for regional bodies without any coordinated 
or uniform decision making and so data gathered from 
different centres may be subject to different restrictions. 
Allowing for flexibility within the data security model is 
therefore essential.  
Clinical  trials  commonly  use  data  from  which 
personal information (e.g. name, address, date of birth) 
is removed but to which a unique patient identifier is 
added,  often  termed  link-anonymised  data.  Such  a 
scheme has the advantage of having a high chance of 
preserving patient anonymity whilst allowing data from 
the same patient to be added at a later date. This scheme 
also allows a specific patient’s data to be located and 
removed  from  the  project  at  any  time  they  request,  a 
condition  usually  imposed  by  ethics  committees.  Full 
patient records are kept for clinical purposes within the 
treating hospital and with the patient’s permission may 
be used to generate and periodically update the clinical 
trials data.   
Clinical trials are usually supported by a centralised 
database where the link-anonymised data is stored. This 
allows the patients to be reassured that their data will be 
afforded a high level of security and allows regulatory 
bodies ease of access to inspect the processes in place. 
For a distributed system, similarly robust arrangements 
must  be  designed  to  reassure  ethics  committees  and 
patients that the data is secure. However, achieving this 
is a significant challenge and here we discuss a potential 
model  for  achieving  this  together  with  the  necessary 
technical  requirements  and  their  proposed  solutions. 
Each  data  collecting  centre  could  have  an  associated 
link-anonymised  database  as  approved  by  their 
appropriate  ethics  committee.  Patient  identifiers  could 
then be kept along with the clinical patient record in the 
treating  hospital.  These  databases  need  be  the  only 
databases  kept  within  the  system  giving  a  truly 
distributed  data-warehouse.  The  limited  data  required 
for  analysis  could  then  be  subject  to  stringent 
anonymisation processes and sent  to a small number of 
specific sites for processing, for example the production 
of classifiers. In this way, the distributed nature of the 
system could be preserved whilst allowing appropriate 
regulatory access to data repositories. Security systems 
will need to be in place which can allow each centre to 
potentially  limit  the  type  of  data  transmitted  and  the 
locations it is transmitted to. 
 
3. The need for an enhanced security model 
 
While complete patient records may be accessed only 
by hospitals and local nodes, link anonymised records 
may be exchanged between a limited numbers of centres 
producing classifiers. Furthermore, only limited amounts 
of data which can be considered as totally anonymised 
may be accessed outside the closed project network. A 
model  shown  in  Figure  1  illustrates  such  a  data 
protection model in a multi-layered fashion. 
 
Figure 1. Prototype secure data protection 
model for HealthAgents 
Apart  from  the  link-anonymised  data  scheme,  the 
mechanism used by the system for decision making itself 
offers a further level of protection to privacy data. In the 
system,  cases  are  processed  and  tumour  classifiers 
produced while the patient privacy is preserved. This is 
because cases are normally only known to the classifier 
producer  software  (agents).  In  the  tumour  diagnosis 
processes,  the  produced  classifier software (agents) as 
opposed to specific cases are used for decision making. 
If  no  such  classifier  is  available  a  new  one  may  be 
produced  using  the  available  cases.  In  any  case,  no 
private patient data that is involved in the production of 
classifiers will be revealed to the clinical users.  
The classifiers, used for differentiating tumour type, 
grade,  or  character,  are  produced  by  using  different 
pattern recognition methods and data trained using the 
available cases. If new clinical centres, with their local 
case  databases,  join  the  existing collaborating centres, 
they can employ the classification services based on the 
validated  data  available  from  around  the  network,  as 
well  as  providing  new  brain  tumour  cases  for  the 
distributed data warehouse. New classifiers can then be 
produced  or  existing  ones  improved  using  these  new 
relevant data available. Figure 2 shows the HealthAgents 
network.  
Figure 2. The HealthAgents network 
The  patient’s private data sent from the hospital is 
protected  by  the  link-anonymised  data  scheme  and its 
exposure  to  users  minimised  by  the  classification 
mechanism. This, however, does not render the system 
safe. Maliciously or accidentally, users may create low 
quality classifiers, or assign unmatched ranking values to 
classifiers.  This  could  happen  if  an  inexperienced 
clinician,  with  good  motivation,  trains  classifiers  or 
updates  their  dynamic  performance  using  low  quality 
spectra (signal-to-noise ratio lower than 10, etc.). The 
use  of  these  classifiers  distracts  the  process  of 
supporting diagnosis and is untrustworthy. Therefore, in 
addition  to  the  private  data  protection  scheme,  a 
mechanism must be in place for the access control of the 
critical  system  resources.  This  is  to  avoid  abuse  or 
misuse  of  them  by  those  without  authorisation  or 
sufficient  privileges.  Yet  it  should  be  sufficiently 
flexible  for  resource  sharing  among  collaborative 
parties.  
The age of patients and brain tumour locations, for 
example,  can  be  associated  with  tumour  types.  This 
information  is  useful  for  diagnosis.  A  contract  signed 
between two clinical centres may allow some cases to be 
transferred to a single trusted third party but no further. 
The  collaboration  of  multiple  centres,  which  not  only 
provide their cases but also require classifiers for their 
own  use,  requires  the  system  to  respect  the  access 
control policies individually employed by each centre. In 
addition, there might be global constraints applicable to 
shared  resources.  All  these  policies  and  constraints 
could  change  continuously  according  to  the  system 
needs. For instance, a new junior clinician who has just 
joined one of the collaborative centres may have no right 
to create a new classifier, or give a definitive diagnosis 
to  a  case  that  will  later  trigger  a  classifier  reputation 
being  updated.  These  operations  could  have  global 
impact on all diagnoses across centres. But he/she may 
be allowed to do such operations later on when they gain 
more  experience.  The  system  may  have  to  assign  to 
different users or even the same user at different times or 
under different contexts, various access rights to system 
resources  distributed  amongst  the  centres.  Moreover, 
after  accumulative  interactions,  the  system  could 
possibly tell which classifiers are good and which are 
bad  in  terms  of  their  performance,  feedback  being 
obtained  from  clinicians  after  their  use  of  them.  The 
system could then, ideally, always find the proper nodes 
where high quality classifiers are built and high quality 
data is supplied, and even adjust the overall interaction 
pattern  to  serve  its  users.  Many  such  scenarios  being 
considered,  a  model  adaptive  to  continuous 
collaboration  is  needed,  concerning  not  only  security 
(access  control  in  particular),  but  also  trust  and 
reputation which all have crucial global effects on the 
overall system. A solution centred on a particular type of 
agents, the YellowPagesAgent, will be discussed next. 
 
4. An enhanced resource controllability and 
performance dependability model 
 
In the heart of the HealthAgents network shown in 
Figure  2  is  the  YellowPagesAgent.  The 
YellowPagesAgent  plays  a  key  role  in  agent 
communication of the HealthAgents system. Agents can 
search  for  other  agents  in  the  YellowPages  based  on 
agent properties and send the messages to the result of 
that  search.  Apart  from  the  yellow  page  function 
originally designed in the system useable to all agents 
for  looking  up  information,  the  YellowPagesAgent  is 
envisioned a key component and a control point for the 
system’s resource access and secure communication, as 
well  as  the  continuous  improvement  of  the  system’s 
performance and hence the value of the system.  
 
4.1 The secure communication mechanism  
 
Communication  amongst  clinical  centres  must  be 
secured. This means that the messages being transported 
in  the  HealthAgents  network  which  might  contain 
patient privacy information or diagnosis results should 
not  be  intercepted  or  modified  by  eavesdroppers. 
Symmetric  encryption  involving  secret  keys  is  best 
suited for the encryption of the message contents while 
asymmetric encryption involving public and private key 
pairs  for  the  protection  of  the  secret  keys.  In  the 
infrastructure,  we  make  use  of  YellowPagesAgent  for 
storing  and  managing  public  keys  and  in  establishing 
trust relationships. Only agents who have been formally 
recognised and registered in the YellowPagesAgent will 
be regarded trustworthy and so YellowPagesAgent plays 
the  role of  Certificate  Authority  (CA)  in  the  sense  of their assurance of the trustworthiness of communicating 
parties.  Being  an  integral  part  of  the  framework,  the 
YellowPagesAgent  simplifies  the  mechanism  of  the 
secure communication. 
 
Figure 3. The secure communication scheme in 
HealthAgents  
More specifically, Figure 3 shows a generic scenario 
with  two  agents  communicate  with  each  other.  The 
receiver agent must at start-up stage, while it registers 
itself to the system via the YellowPagesAgent, generates 
a  pair  of  public  and  private  keys.  The  public  key  is 
obtained by the YellowPagesAgent and the private key 
obtained by itself. The sender agent can retrieve receiver 
agent’s  public  key,  at  runtime,  from  a  key  store 
maintained  by  the  YellowPagesAgent.  Upon obtaining 
this public key, the sender agent generates a secret key 
that will be used to encrypt the plain-text message to be 
secured.  The  secret  key  must  be  shared  between  two 
agents.  This  can  be  achieved  via  the  sender  agent’s 
encryption of the secret key using receiver agent’s public 
key. This data with the secret key encrypted is further 
signed by the sender agent’s private key. The secret key 
protected message and the private key protected secret 
key  is  encapsulated  in  the  transmitted  message.  Upon 
receiving  the  message,  the  receiver  agent  reads  the 
sender  agent’s  signed  data  and  verifies  its  identity  by 
retrieving the public key of the sender agent from the 
common public key store. The data is then decrypted by 
the receiver agent using its own private key and thus the 
secret key is revealed. The encrypted message will be 
finally  decrypted  using  the  secret  key.  A  common 
approach  for  implementing  this  scheme  is  the  Java 
Cryptograph Architecture (JCA). 
 
4.2 The resource access control scheme 
 
The  other  layer  of  security  in  the  HealthAgents 
system is concerned about the resource access control in 
the business level as opposed to the physical network 
level.  This  layer  of  security  requires  more  delicate 
considerations where ordinary business needs shall not 
be  compromised  and  the  users  access  what  they  have 
been  granted.  The  YellowPagesAgent  constrains  the 
collaboration  pattern  through  the  imposition  of  access 
control. 
Specifically, the YellowPagesAgent can be looked up 
by  Clinical  GUI  Agents  which  send  questions  to  be 
solved and then a list of classifiers appropriate in that 
context will be returned. Moreover, the yellow pages can 
be referred to for data sources when new classifiers need 
to  be  produced.  In  this  business  infrastructure,  the 
YellowPagesAgent  maintains  a  list  of  available 
classifiers, along with their associated profiles including 
abilities  (questions  to  be  solved  for  clinicians), 
reputation, and a profile of the training data with which 
they were produced. 
Once  trained  by  the  Training  Manager  Agent,  new 
classifiers  can  register  themselves  with  the 
YellowPagesAgent  together  with  their  profiles. 
Clinicians  can  then  search  for  those  relevant  to  the 
particular  cases  under  consideration  using  the  GUI 
Agent. Once classification results are produced, they are 
evaluated  via  comparing  with  the  validated  diagnosis 
results supplied by the clinicians and the reputation of 
classifiers  is  updated  accordingly  in  the 
YellowPagesAgent.  The  next  time  when  they  are 
running,  more  accurate  information  about  these 
classifiers  is  known  to  the  clinicians.  This  process 
continues  iteratively  and  the  YellowPagesAgent  keeps 
updating  classifier  profiles  for  the  most  accurate  and 
efficient performance of the overall system possible. 
 
Figure 4. The sequence diagram of data and 
classifier access control in HealthAgents 
Figure 4 shows the message passing sequence among 
several HealthAgents agents. The processes of running 
and  building  of  classifiers  are  included  as  part  of  the 
overall  diagram.  The  diagram  illustrates  the 
YellowPagesAgent’s function in informing clinicians of 
classifiers  and  informing  classifier  producers  of  data 
sources for the production, as well as maintaining the 
reputation  of  classifiers.  Two  major  alternative interactions  involving  distinct  YellowPagesAgent 
functions are differentiated and shown in the upper and 
lower partition of the “alt” region with their respective 
guards.  Various  security  policy  sets  are  applied  in 
corresponding  circumstances,  e.g.  when  available 
classifiers are queried and, once the validated diagnosis 
of the case is given by the clinician, reputation values of 
the executed ones are updated and so YellowPagesAgent 
is  maintained.  The  security  constraints  are  usually 
explicitly  expressed  and  such  knowledge  is  subject  to 
continuous  maintenance,  being  in  a  direct  human 
intervene process as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. A scheme relating the impacting 
factors to data and classifier access control  
The design diagram of Figure 4 indicates the global 
resource  access  control  the  YellowPagesAgent  could 
impose as well as the affect it could make to the overall 
classification results through its own performance. We 
are aiming at achieving flexible management of security 
access  and  continuous  performance  enhancement, 
respectively,  through  the  careful  design  of  the 
YellowPagesAgent.  
In  the  secure  access  perspective,  clinicians  with 
certain  access  rights  should  only  access  the  proper 
resources  and  do  the  proper  operations.  The 
YellowPagesAgent  may  reject  access  to  private 
classifiers (e. g. a classifier trained exclusively with data 
from one and only hospital, as opposite to a public one, 
trained with data from all the hospitals in the network) 
from external centres. Also, the YellowPagesAgent may 
reject  classification  production  requests  or  classifier 
reputation updating requests from certain clinicians. But 
such response should by no means be fixed. Instead, it 
should use the up-to-date policies to reflect the current 
security  needs.  A  security  policy  model  elaborated  in 
Section 5 will discuss in more details a solution to the 
outlined security infrastructure.  
 
4.3  The  performance  and  system  usability 
enhancement  
 
In the performance and system usability enhancement 
perspective, the appropriate classifiers for use depends 
on many factors, including not only the performance, but 
also the similarity of the new case under classification 
with the ones used for training the classifier. Again, a 
flexible  model  must  be  available  to  the 
YellowPagesAgent  to  serve  classification  requests, 
transparently  to  end  users.  Briefly,  the  suitability  of 
classifiers being used for classification depends on  the 
followings and these are illustrated in Figure 6. 
•  Similarity of the new case with the training set from 
which the classifier is derived. 
•  Static performance of the classifier. The classifier 
the  evaluation  is  based  on  the  accuracy,  the 
balanced  error  rate,  or  the  geometric  mean  of 
success  as  calculated  after  the  training.  This  is 
generally obtained with an independent test set or, if 
not  available,  using  techniques  such  as  cross 
validation. 
•  Dynamic performance of the classifier. This is the 
performance of the classifier with the ‘unseen’ cases 
the clinicians launch for orientation purposes. The 
answer given by the classifier is compared with the 
diagnosis the clinicians give once they are sure of it. 
•  Use level of the classifier. 
•  Evolution  of  all  the  previous  factors  during  the 
classifier’s life. 
 
Figure 6. A scheme relating the impacting 
factors to classifier reputation/ranking  
The knowledge accumulated in the running processes 
of  the  HealthAgents  system  is  therefore  of  significant 
value  to  the  automatic  improvement  of  system 
performance.  Comparatively,  such  knowledge  is 
implicitly incremented as opposed to explicitly specified 
as Figure 5 shows.  
To enhance the management of both reputation and 
security  perspectives  of  the  system,  data,  classifiers, 
security  policies,  and  even  people  distributed  among 
multiple  clinical  centres  must  collaborate  in a manner 
that  respects disparate impacting factors and take into 
account  their  dynamics.  Note  that  both  the  “Security 
Constraints” in Figure 5 and the “Classifier Profiles” in 
Figure 6 are managed by the YellowPagesAgent. These 
can be seen as two sets of metadata or knowledgebase 
that  the  agent  uses  in  working  between  users  and 
resources.  The  “Security  Constraints”  are  used  in  the 
first place to justify if users can access resources and if 
so, then the “Classifier Profiles” are used to choose the 
suitable resources for authorised users. The principle is simple, in the distributed environment, users should have 
limited access to resources but if they do have the access 
rights they should be offered the best possible services. 
The  system  must  be  aware  of  such  facts  as  who  can 
access what, as well as which are the best services to 
provide in that context, if such an access is permitted. 
The  building  and  maintenance  of  such  metadata  is  of 
primary  importance  to  the  proper  running  of  the 
distributed  collaborative  system  and  achieving  its  full 
value. Considering the public key store in Section 4.1, 
the  repository  maintained  by  yellow  pages  includes  a 
total  of  three  types  of  metadata  that  enable  the 
YellowPagesAgent  to  play  three  types  of  roles, 
contributing  to  a  secure  and  dependable  healthcare 
system.  
An approach that enables the YellowPagesAgent to 
behave securely and adaptively via the Adaptive Agent 
Model [5] [6], being part of an integrated methodology 
and  providing  a  secure  resource  access  control 
mechanism  that  supports  the  infrastructure  outlined  in 
Section 4.2, is now discussed in the following section. 
 
5. A solution based on an adaptive security 
policy model 
 
Table 1. Two example interactions in 
HealthAgents with their security implication  
Interaction 
between 
YellowPages 
Agent  and 
clinicians 
Interaction description  Security 
implication 
Queries about 
classifiers  are 
answered  only  if 
the  clinician  has 
access  rights  to 
the  required 
classifiers  in  the 
classifier 
directory. 
Clinicians 
want  to  solve 
questions 
The clinician sends a MRS case 
along  with diagnose  (or differential) 
he/she  thinks  suitable  to  the  case 
(tumour or non-tumour, aggressive or 
non-aggressive,  glioblastoma  or 
metastasis,  etc.).  Classifiers  trained 
with MRS data that can discriminate 
among tumour classes or grades (so 
answer various questions) have been 
previously  registered  in  the  yellow 
pages, including descriptions of their 
capabilities, reputation, and data they 
have been trained upon. 
Secure  access 
of  yellow  page 
directory  service: 
query classifiers 
The  clinician 
must be authorised 
to update the case 
record  as  well  as 
classifier 
reputation. 
Clinicians 
want  to  give 
feedback  after 
using classifiers 
When  the  correct  diagnosis  is 
known for the case, the clinician will 
update the case record in the database 
with  this  information.  The 
classification results produced by the 
selected  classifiers  will  be evaluated 
and  their  reputation  (dynamic 
performance)  updated  in  the  yellow 
pages  so  that  other  clinicians  will 
have  better  knowledge  about  how 
good  each  of  these  classifiers  is  in 
later use. 
Secure  access 
of  yellow  page 
directory  service: 
update  classifier 
reputation values 
Concerning only the upper part of the Figure 4, the 
scenario  of  running  classifiers  where  classifiers  are 
queried and their reputation updated can be described in 
Table  1,  giving  the  security  implication.  Two  distinct 
policy  sets  may  have  to  be  applied  in  the  query  and 
updating  conditions.  These  security  policies  must  be 
integrated into the business functions of the Multi-Agent 
System with its actual functions being intact during the 
configuration of policies. Adaptive Agent Model (AAM) 
provides  such  a  framework  for  seamless  integration. 
AAM is a methodology that guides the building of an 
interaction and computation model [7] to drive adaptive 
agent  system  behaviour.  The  model  originates  from 
business  requirements,  is  interpreted  and  executed 
dynamically by agents at runtime, and under continuous 
maintenance  by  business  people.  Existing  components 
and services can be reused to support agents to execute 
business requirements captured in the model. Tools have 
been  developed  to  support  the  documentation  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  model.  Reaction  Rules  (RRs)  and 
Policy  Rules  (PRs)  are  central  model  elements  that 
compose  the  model  and  reside  in  separate  knowledge 
repositories shown in the scenario of Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Agent interaction model with security 
policy rule application, using the AAM [5] [6] 
Each RR guides an agent its individual responsibility 
of service provision function in reaction to other agents 
and in this way that agent contributes its own capability 
to  the  overall  interaction  process.  The  RR  has  the 
following scheme. 
Reaction Rule Scheme: 
{(Name,  Interaction,  Owner),  Event,  Processing,  (Condition, 
Action)n} 
In Figure 7, YellowPagesAgent uses its RR “Return 
classifiers” to react to Clinician GUI Agent’s “Request 
classification”, the RR being part of the first interaction 
shown  in  Table  1  and  formalised  in  Figure  8.  A 
“ClassifierService”  facilitates  the  agent  to  retrieve 
appropriate  classifiers  in  various  conditions.  If  the 
clinician has sufficient privilege, he/she will have access to all classifiers that matches the current case or those 
that can answer the questions that have to be solved. 
 
Figure 8. An example Reaction Rule  
One or several PRs may be collectively selected and 
applied  in  such  processes  to  reflect  global  business 
policies  that  must  be  complied  in  service  fulfilment, 
shared  by  all  agents  in  the  system.  The  original  PR 
scheme has been adapted and specialised as security PR, 
enforcing  security  constraints  during  RR  function  [7] 
[8]. The security PR has the following scheme. 
Security Policy Rule Scheme: 
{Subject (Id, Role, Organisation), Access Operation (Op), Access 
Context (Co), Resource (Id, Type)} 
 
Figure 9. An example security Policy Rule  
Agents, assigned with specific roles, have their access 
constrained  by  instances  of  policy  rules  of  such  a 
scheme,  in  the  dimensions  of  (1)  resources  they  can 
access; (2) operations they can perform upon resources; 
and  (3)  access  contexts.  The  YellowPagesAgent  is  in 
charge  of  access  to  all  the  available  classifiers  and 
responds to requests for obtaining classifiers as well as 
updating their reputation. Not all clinicians can do both 
of these tasks. One security PR is formalised in Figure 9. 
The  constraints  identified  on  the  PR  (as  shown  in 
Figure  9)  are  enforced  upon  agents  with  their  normal 
functions identified on the RR (as shown in Figure 8). 
This is achieved through an integrated role concept [8]. 
Here  agent’s  functional  duty  role  as  described  by  the 
Agent-Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) [8] and 
agent’s social rights role as described by the Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC) [10] are seamlessly integrated. 
The principle is: 
A role plays its functional duties if and only if its social rights allow it 
to do so. 
Functional  duty  role  is dynamically bound  with  social right role 
before any agent plays the integrated role. 
Clinicians  may  play  the  role  of  “Request 
classification”  and  “Update  classifier  reputation” 
functionally.  But it depends on their roles (as well as 
associated ID and Organisation) assigned socially they 
may or may not indeed perform the claimed functions. 
Figure 7 demonstrates two Security Policy Rules being 
defined.  Shown  in  Figure  9, p_001 says this clinician 
can  perform  classification  by  using  any  existing 
classifier across centres. Assume p_002 says only senior 
clinicians can update classifier reputation. Then, when a 
junior clinician comes to use the system, he/she will be 
allowed to do the “classify” operation with the classifier 
c1, c3, and c6 returned which match the current case. 
But  he/she will be rejected of the reputation updating 
request since its precondition of policy rule satisfaction 
fails. Both RR and security PR have been formalised in 
the XML model so that agents can uniformly perform 
their  duties  if  they  are  found  having  the  appropriate 
rights [5] [6] [8]. 
Our  approach  complies  with  Object  Management 
Group’s  (OMG)  Model  Driven  Architecture  (MDA) 
paradigm [11]. The model that drives agent behaviour, 
functionally and securely, is associated with but external 
to  the  agents.  In  the  special  case  of  the 
YellowPagesAgent, this means the agent that manages 
the system critical resource of classifiers always applies 
the security policy rules from the up-to-date rule set that 
are relevant to the current resource access requests. This 
process is carried out on the fly. Consequently, once new 
security policy rules become available which reflect the 
current  security  needs,  they  can  immediately  become 
effective in the running system. Such an infrastructure 
allows the agent system to behave adaptively and easy to 
maintain.  More  importantly,  (changing)  security  needs 
are respected and put into effect instantly.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have presented in this paper a link-anonymised 
data scheme for private data protection. In addition, we 
have offered an approach for secure communication as 
well  as  a  more  advanced  secure  data  access  control 
mechanism. In this way, no private information may be 
revealed to unauthorised people, and authorised people can  only  access  critical  system  resources  with  the 
permitted power. 
Our  approach  contributes  a  security  model  driven 
software  architecture.  The  integration  of  the  security 
model  into  the  functional  interaction  model  allows 
agents to dynamically evaluate and apply the appropriate 
security  policies  before  they  perform  their  actual 
capabilities,  a  behaviour  being  driven  by  the 
combinational model. Changes to security needs have no 
effect to the rest of the system concerning core system 
functionalities. This allows the definition of any number 
of policies after the system has been developed, security 
requirements not entangled with others.  
The  agent  technology  is  promising  in  both  the 
building  of  a  distributed  decision  support  system  for 
healthcare and ensuring its security. On one hand, agents 
have the capabilities for representing different services 
required by the system and providing the backbone to 
ensure the distribution of data. On the other hand, their 
abstraction  of  different  processes  where  resources  are 
accessed can be under the security control if appropriate 
measures are imposed upon them.  
Several  approaches  have  been  investigated  that 
employ  agents  in  healthcare  domains  for  providing 
security. One proposed scheme introduces the concept of 
heuristic security agents [14] which intercept all calls to 
resources  and  check  them  against  behavioural  rules 
before an “allow” or “deny” decision is made. Another 
method is proposed for the secure access of electronic 
healthcare records (EHR) which may be scattered across 
healthcare units [12]. A security agent will be employed 
per hospital site which authenticates users and controls 
the access to the local resources by looking at the user 
roles.  This  approach  has  its  limitation  in  the  types  of 
resources it can protect as well as the use of the shared 
common  services  amongst  multiple  sites.  A  third 
approach  introduces  a  central  access  control  (CAC) 
system and multiple local access control (LAC) systems 
[13] to the similar distributed record exchange problem. 
CAC  and  LAC  are  Multi-Agent  Systems  which  use 
authentication  agents,  encryption  agents,  and  access 
control agents. In this architecture, the security level is 
determined by the weakest LAC. 
All  the  above  methods  introduce  agents  or  Multi-
Agent  Systems  explicitly  for  the  purpose  of  access 
control,  security  not  being  considered  as  part  of  an 
integrated software design by software engineers in the 
first place. A software system may have its functionality 
and usability negatively compromised if security is to be 
added or fixed after its implementation. As opposed to 
these,  in  our  approach  security  policies  are  pluggable 
and  maintainable  in  the  system  from  the  beginning. 
Participant agents serve core clinical business functions 
with associated security measures or policies applicable 
by  the  agents  as  behavioural  constraints  before  their 
performance  of  normal  functioning  behaviour  in  the 
clinical setting. The HealthAgents system will be made 
more  effectively  and  flexibly  secure  but  work  so  far 
indicates that our approach is promising and useful to 
the development of a distributed decision support system 
for secure healthcare applications. 
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